According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[pood]

Guess I’ll just a little while longer.

Because it’s true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then tomorrow there must necessarily be a sea battle.

Because God knows today that tomorrow you will have eggs for breakfast, then tomorrow you must necessarily have eggs.

Because one thing causes another, then tomorrow you must necessarily pick Coke instead of Pepsi.

All modal fallacies. There is no necessity in any of the conclusions. This is precisely where hard determinism, or pre-determinism, or fatalism, or what have you, falls apart.

But I have indeed explained this many times.

Now I ask @DBT again — perhaps I missed an earlier reply — how does determinism design a building?

Indeed, the designing is deterministic — it is determined by the designer, which is precisely why compatibilist free will requires determinism to be true. The mistake is to allege that determinism is some coercive agency or force that makes the architect design a building the way he does. This error to to think that determinism is prescriptive rather than descriptive.

And this is the error that hard determinists make.

 

[pood]

If p then q, determinism

If p then necessarily q, modal fallacy,

 

[steve_bank]

If p then q, determinism

If p then necessarily q, modal fallacy,

determinism is a philosophy.

if p then q might be called deterministic. As in a + b = 20 is deterministic

 

[Jarhyn]

If p then q, determinism

If p then necessarily q, modal fallacy,

Where necessarily P, necessarily Q; where not necessarily P, not necessarily Q. But the necessity of Q depends on the necessity of P.

The problem is in justifying the necessity of P, which is itself a set of assumptions, and you aren't allowed to say your assumptions are necessarily true.

As such, the necessitation of Q depends on the context of P.

Mathematicians resolve this by faithfully indicating what sets the Q emerges under as a part of P (by indicating 'under' Z or R or somesuch set).

And the more I think about this, the more I think about scope in a program because this comes up frequently. You see, in programming we have an idea about global and local scopes and of scope hierarchy. We also have ways we use the idea of necessitation under declarations to solve problems: under these declarations, some Boolean test may necessarily evaluate to true (but if you change the declaration, it will not necessarily evaluate to true).

By adding the necessary to the end, you automatically assume necessity of some or all of your axioms... But assuming necessity of axioms is not allowed.

 

[bilby]

their definition of free will is flawed. That it is flawed because it does not account for how will is generated by a brain in the context of a deterministic system

As long as will is generated by a brain, it is the will of the individual whose brain generates it.

It is not the will of the starting conditions of the universe; If MY brain, as an entirely deterministic system, generates will, that will is MY will, and acting in accordance with it is down to me - I am willing my actions, and nobody and nothing else is. My will is free from the wills of anyone or anything other than me.

All of this remains true regardless of any "context".

A watch tells the time. All of the components of the watch are bits of metal and glass, none of which has any relationship to measuring time; You cannot tell time just by looking at a spring or a cogwheel. Similarly, a brain generates will. You cannot tell what a brain wills by looking at a neuron or a microtubule.

The whole is more than the mere sum of the parts; It is not the components alone, but rather the components, plus their interactions with each other, plus the ways in which those interactions change, that makes a watch tell time, or a person tell you what she wills.

No magical soul, nor imaginary indeterminiteness, nor quantum randomness is needed; Just the fact that a complex system behaves in ways, and generates new behaviours, that none of its individual components do, or even could possibly do, on their own.

That behaviour can be entirely, completely, absolutely and definitely deterministic; But it is, nevertheless, determined by the system itself. My deterministic brain deterministically (and without any non-deterministic influences or inputs) determines what I freely will, and nothing else in the deterministc universe can do that - not even the individual components of my brain working in isolation from the whole.

That's my definition of free will. If it were flawed, you could indicate the flaw; But actually, you just have an opinion that your definition is 'right', and mine is 'wrong', and you have neither sound logic nor observable fact to back that opinion up.

You believe that this is not "the" definition of free will, because it is not your preferred definition of free will. But it is my definition of free will, and your claim that it is "flawed" is unjustified - unless and until you can justify it by reference to something other than your mere preference for a different definition.

If my definition is not a definition of free will (and a very widely accepted one at that), then how do you account for the observation that people generally behave as though individuals have basic desert responsibility for their actions and choices?

It seems to me that your definition is carefully crafted for the sole purpose of declaring free will impossible.

E pur si muove.

It observably is not only possible, but ubiquitous, as anyone who chooses to look can see for themselves.

 

[pood]

^^^
That is it right there. Well said,

 

[pood]

It bears emphasizing how ridiculous the hard determinism of @DBT is.

I’ve mentioned before how at his blog the biologist Jerry Coyne, when he isn’t attacking trans rights or plumping for slaughter in Gaza, bangs on about hard determinism and how we are all meat robots. He relates the tale of how he told a jazz musician that he didn’t write his composition, hard determinism did. He says the musician got really angry and then someone, I believe it supposedly was Richard Dawkins, stepped in to smooth things over. The vainglorious little twit is always name dropping, and recently posted a picture of himself grinning side by side with the execrable little racist shit James D. Watson. But anyway.

Think about that: the composer didn’t write his piece, hard determinism did! How exactly does that work? Hard determinism flows into the composer’s head and then out through his fingers to write the complex notes? The poor composer is just an empty suit, a meat robot, a puppet whose strings are being pulled by — the Big Bang? How does the Big Bang know what notes to write, how to compose anything? Blank out. We get no answer from hard determinists, just the bare claim that this nonsense is true.

And yet at the same time, DBT says the brain is the sole agent of thought and response, which is correct! How does that admission square with his hard determinism?

Keep in mind too that Coyne recently wrote a post or two arguing against genetic determinism (which it seems is what Sapolsky is plumping for) without noticing how this argument contradicts his hard determinism. How do you tell people that evolution is driven by natural selection operating on random mutations plus genetic drift, the latter a completely stochastic process, without noticing how these claims contradict hard determinism???

How does one square that circle?

 

[pood]

Novel Written by Hard Determinism Wins Pulitzer Prize

IIDB (Internet News Service) — A novel written by the illustrious novelist Hard Determinism has been awarded the Pulitzer Prize for fiction.

The novel, The Gallant Gallstone, was entirely cribbed from the novel The Fountainhead, also written by Mr. Determinism via the meat robot Ayn Rand. Therefore there was no question of plagiarism.

The novel tells the story of a gallstone that thinks it has free will but then is dissolved by castor oil, proving somehow or other that free will is an illusion.

“I couldn’t be more hard-determined honored by this hard-determined award,” Mr. Determinism told a gaggle of hard-determined reporters who were hard-determined to ask Mr. Determinism stupid hard-determined questions. “I only wish that I actually knew how to write.”

Mr. Determinism said his next project was to take dictation from the Big Bang without the slightest clue what he was going to write about.

“The Big Bang will let my (His) fingers do the talking,” Mr. Determinism said, adding that “Hard Determinism — that is, me — will permit no alternate choices.”

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

I am willing my actions

Do you experience this willing? If so, can you describe that experience?

 

[Jarhyn]

I am willing my actions

Do you experience this willing? If so, can you describe that experience?

I personally do. Because my brain offers images and metaphors: it's like there being a lever to push; if the lever is pushed so much, something will release, so as to trigger.

It's like that moment where you're trying to force a sneeze rather than waiting for it, and there's some weird-ass game where something gets pushed over a threshold and something new happens.

Sometimes it is complicated, and involves all sorts of crazy things held in the mind at the same time so as to hold certain systems in the right state for the outcome, like spinning plates.

Other times it is simple, like whacking a single button past the equilibrium point.

Still others, it is like trying to hold a lever still and it just smoothly pulling away and through and going anyway, such as happens when I'm about to start puking.

Usually, though, it could be characterized as a "push".

 

[pood]

I am willing my actions

Do you experience this willing? If so, can you describe that experience?

Sure. I contemplate this post, consider it, compose in my head a response, and then write and post the response. If I am not doing that, who or what is?

 

[DBT]

Modal fallacy? If there is, compatibilism is based on a modal fallacy, which is another reason to reject compatibilism.

How is compatibilism based on a modal fallacy?

I do not think you know what a modal fallacy is, no matter how many times I explain it.

You tell me, you are the one who invokes the modal fallacy defence. I just stick to the given definitions, how compatibilists define determinism and how they define free will.

I don't dispute their definition of determinism, but merely point out that their definition of free will is flawed. That it is flawed because it does not account for how will is generated by a brain in the context of a deterministic system (just as it is defined).

So where exactly is this so called modal fallacy? It's not enough to keep invoking it, you need to explain this presumed modal fallacy in relation to incompatibilism.

But I have exolained it, many times. Guess you’re just not listening.

You have tried to explain, but I have yet to see an adequate explanation.

Again, given that it is compatibilists that give their definition of free will in relation to their definition of determinism, and incompatibilists, accepting the given definition of determinism, point out the flaw in the compatibilist definition of free will......where exactly does the modal fallacy lie?

 

[DBT]

their definition of free will is flawed. That it is flawed because it does not account for how will is generated by a brain in the context of a deterministic system

As long as will is generated by a brain, it is the will of the individual whose brain generates it.

It's not enough. Using that criteria, it could be said that computers have free will, as Jarhyn claims.

Simple organisms have will, the drive to eat, procreate, etc, yet without the ability to reason, are not seen as moral agents.

The brain generates will according to its neural architecture and condition, be it functional or dysfunctional.

Neural architecture and non-chosen condition does not equate to freedom of will.

Which may be asserted, but not demonstrated.

Nor does the flawed compatibilist definition, acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced help establish freedom of will.

The non chosen condition of a brain does far more than 'unduly influence' will and action, it determines it. It fixes will and action in any given instance of decision making.

That is not a matter of free will, just information processing and related response.

 

[DBT]

I am willing my actions

Do you experience this willing? If so, can you describe that experience?

Sure. I contemplate this post, consider it, compose in my head a response, and then write and post the response. If I am not doing that, who or what is?

How is your experience being generated? There lies the difficulty for the notion of free will.

 

[pood]

Again, given that it is compatibilists that give their definition of free will in relation to their definition of determinism, and incompatibilists, accepting the given definition of determinism, point out the flaw in the compatibilist definition of free will......where exactly does the modal fallacy lie?

There is no flaw in the compatibilist definition of free will. There is a flaw in the INCOMPATIBILIST definition of free will.

 

[bilby]

I am willing my actions

Do you experience this willing? If so, can you describe that experience?

Sure I can, if I want to.

 

[pood]

I am willing my actions

Do you experience this willing? If so, can you describe that experience?

Sure. I contemplate this post, consider it, compose in my head a response, and then write and post the response. If I am not doing that, who or what is?

How is your experience being generated? There lies the difficulty for the notion of free will.

I believe it was you who stated that the brain is the sole agent of thought and response.

 

[bilby]

their definition of free will is flawed. That it is flawed because it does not account for how will is generated by a brain in the context of a deterministic system

As long as will is generated by a brain, it is the will of the individual whose brain generates it.

It's not enough. Using that criteria, it could be said that computers have free will, as Jarhyn claims.

So? Do you have any evidence or reasoning that leads to the conclusion "computers cannot have free will"?

If so, I would like to see it. If not, this is just the logical fallacy of Argument from Consequences, leavened with the assumption that nobody wants (or believes) that a computer could ever have free will.

Simple organisms have will, the drive to eat, procreate, etc, yet without the ability to reason, are not seen as moral agents.

Indeed. So what? That doesn't mean that complex organisms cannot be moral agents. Indeed, my entire point rests on the understanding that complexity leads to a whole that differs from its parts - that we should expect complexity to be a necessary condition for moral agency.

The brain generates will according to its neural architecture and condition, be it functional or dysfunctional.

Yes. We do not disagree on this, and I wonder why you feel the need to repeat it so often.

Neural architecture and non-chosen condition does not equate to freedom of will.

No, of course not. Those two things are not required for freedom of will; Nor do they prevent it.

Which may be asserted, but not demonstrated.

That seems to be a fragment of a sentence; I am not sure what it relates to here.

Nor does the flawed compatibilist definition, acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced help establish freedom of will.

Of course it does. Freedom of will has acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced as a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite.

If someone has a gun to my head, I lack freedom to choose not to give them my wallet; But a rock has no freedom to choose anything, even if nobody points a gun at it.

The non chosen condition of a brain does far more than 'unduly influence' will and action, it determines it. It fixes will and action in any given instance of decision making.

The brain is deterministic, as are all physical systems (we assume for the sake of argument - obviously this may be untrue); But that doesn't imply that its "condition" is unchosen. The conditions of its components are, for sure; But the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Brains are massively parallel processors of information, with huge numbers of feedback loops - our choices, made just now, form part of the starting conditions for our next decisions.

You are thinking at the wrong scale here. Your complaint is exactly analogous to: "the components of a wristwatch - the cogwheels and spindles and springs - cannot measure time; Therefore nor can a wristwatch".

That is not a matter of free will, just information processing and related response.

What more is needed for free will?

A brain that made indeterministic choices would be insane. "I chose to eat a big lunch because I skipped breakfast" is a choice, made by me, even if I am a set of entirely deterministic physical interactions. If my actions were not deterministic, my choice would look more like "I chose to play a game of chess because I skipped breakfast", or "I chose to eat a big lunch because I saw an oddly shaped cloud".

Determinism is foundational - anything more than a tiny amount of randomness in our choices would be literal insanity; Zero randomness is what we should expect from a sane decision maker.

Complexity and unpredictability don't require randomness. Just just information processing and related response, from a sufficiently complex system (eg a human brain).

 

[pood]

I am willing my actions

Do you experience this willing? If so, can you describe that experience?

Sure. I contemplate this post, consider it, compose in my head a response, and then write and post the response. If I am not doing that, who or what is?

How is your experience being generated? There lies the difficulty for the notion of free will.

I refer you to this post.

I ask you to explain how determinism writes a jazz piece when, remember, you yourself said that the brain is sole agent of thought and response,

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

I contemplate this post, consider it

But the words “contemplate” and “consider” are not themselves descriptive. They can refer to experiences, but they do not describe experiences.